

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070009-5

TOP SECRET

25X1

Copy 2 of 9
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Graham in re
Special PRD Study

25X6

25X6

1. I met with General Graham from 1030 to 1110 on 20 June to discuss the paper cited above. There was some banter, with Graham expressing the hope that I would not ruin his day, which, since he was leaving for Fort Hood, Texas at 1300, didn't look too promising anyhow. I indicated that we hoped that he would realize that our purpose in this paper was not to create difficulties for him. He seemed to accept this proposition without major (or at least obvious) reservations.

2. After a very quick glance through the paper, Graham indicated that he was concerned that we had left out an important piece of information,

25X6

3. After another look at the paper, and especially from p 13 on (at my suggestion), Graham said he disagreed with the paper's

25X1

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070009-5

UMBRA

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070009-5

TOP SECRET

findings because, if he had it to do over again, even in the light of our paper, he would still issue the same kind of (7 March) Warning Appraisal and still urge USIB to alter the (27 March) SNIE, i. e., in the way that it actually was altered. I indicated that I thought there was at least a possibility that he would change his mind about these matters if, later, he had the time to read our paper carefully. He promised to do so when he could, presumably sometime this week. In any case, he said he would let us know about his reactions and his suggestions. He clearly did not wish any further dissemination of the paper at this time.

4. Inter alia, Graham said that he already had enough problems within the DOD; that both Secretary Schlesinger and Chairman Brown had praised him for issuing the Warning Appraisal; and that he had asked them (presumably not in the context of this particular Warning Appraisal) how many false alarms DIA would be "allowed" each year. Further, Graham said, he thought the whole question of alarms--the relationship of true and false, one to the other, and the "costs" of false alarms--should be explored rigorously, probably by the IC Staff. (I did not encourage him to pursue this.)

5. Graham stated that this was the right way for PRD to do business, i. e., show him a paper (in part critical of DIA) privately.

6. It may be that General Graham will await General Wilson's return from leave before he responds to our paper. Then again, he may not.

Chief, PRD/IC

Attachment:

Distribution:

Copy 1 - A/D/DCI/IC (w/att, Cy. #1)

② - EO/ICS

3 - D/DCI/IC

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070009-5

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070009-5